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Human "Wrongs"?: The U.S. Takes an
Unpopular Stance in Opposing a Strong
International Criminal Court, Gaining
Unlikely Allies in the Process
I. INTRODUCTION
There can be no global justice unless the worst of crimes-crimes against
humanity-are subject to the law. In this age more than ever we recognize that the
crime of genocide against one people truly is an assault on us all-a crime against
humanity. The establishment of an International Criminal Court will ensure that
humanity's response will be swift and will be just.'
In July of 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the interest
of human rights and a greater peace, made a decision which has the potential for
making a lasting mark against tyranny, serious crimes against humanity, and the
atrocities associated with war and armed conflict.2 The International Criminal
Court (ICC) was intended to be, and will be, a forum designated to try war
criminals of the worst degree: those who are accused of committing genocide,
crimes against humanity, and the gravest of war crimes The new tribunal was
given life in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which also lays
the foundation for its jurisdiction, its powers, its makeup, and the rules by which
it will operate.4 In theory, of course, the ICC is a welcome addition to the world's
arsenal to combat serious human rights violations. This ideal is backed by the
overwhelming worldwide support for the ICC.' Reportedly, as it became evident
that the ICC would be voted in by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly,

1. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiares on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, (visited January 2, 1999).
<http://www.tn.org/icc/main.htm>.

2. On July 17, 1998, by a plenary assembly, the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC Statute) was adopted by a vote of 120 for and 7 against, with 21 abstentions. See Candace
Hughes, War Crimes Court Approved, ABCNews.com. (July 17, 1998)
<http://www.abcnews.com/sections/world/Daily News/intl court 980717.html>.
3. See Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, A/Conf.183/9, art. 5 (July 17, 1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
4. See infra notes 43-79 and accompanying text.

5. See Hughes, supra note 2.
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the floor erupted into spontaneous cheers and applause.6 Its supporters have
reveled in the story of success, encouraged by the overwhelming victory of its
framers.' By contrast, the United States has joined with a few unlikely allies in its
opposition of the ICC. 8 Ironically, allied with its traditional military foes Iraq,
Syria, and Libya, the United States has opposed and attempted to undermine the
ICC from the birth of its concept.9 As this Comment will explore in full, there
seems to be no legitimate humanitarian justification for the United States' decision
to oppose this tribunal. The United States has, historically, and to this day,
continued to label itself as a protector of human rights and the leader of the free
world.' o Although these facts contradict each other on their face, one must
acknowledge that the United States has historically kept an air of determination to
bring human rights violators to justice." The reason for this apparent discrepancy

6. Although its approval was met with cheers and applause, the U.S. Delegates were not among
those making noise, as it meant that their strenuous objections to the ICC were being ignored by the rest
of the world. See id.
7. See, e.g., William R. Pace, WE WON!, ROME TREATY CONF. MONITOR, Issue 26, (July 18,
1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/ html/monitor.htm>.
8. See Jorgen Wouters, America vs. Its Allies, ABCNEWS.COM, (July 17, 1998)
<http://www.abcnews.com/sections/wordIDailyNews /1CC 980715.html>.
9. See id.
10. In January, 1998, for example, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright was quoted as
saying, "We have an obligation that we must meet, as members of organizations we helped build, to
abide by rules we helped write, to further goals of law, peace and prosperity that Americans deeply
support." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RIGHTS FOR ALL 123 (1998)
[hereinafter RIGHTS FOR ALL]. This ideal, of course, is more rhetoric than policy, and although the
United States tends to think of itself as a human rights mecca, even it has a troubled history of human
rights violations. See id. For example, police brutality continues to be reported at alarming rates. See
id. The United States has a less than stellar record when it comes to the treatment of people seeking
asylum within its boundaries. See id. The death penalty, long abolished in most of the Western World
and denounced by the International Courts which have addressed human rights violations involved in
the enforcement thereof, is being employed at an all-time high rate in the United States. See id.
11. For example, the United States played a large role at the Nuremberg Trials, in which Nazi war
criminals were prosecuted for the macabre acts they helped commit. See J.A.S. GRENVILLE, A HISTORY
OF THE WORLD INTHE TwENTIETH CENTURY 333 (1994). At the trials, as my article will shed light on,
an affirmative defense taken by the war criminals at Nuremberg was the famous "superior orders"
defense. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. This defense seeks to avoid culpability in the
alleged crime due to the fact that the defendant was merely obeying orders of a superior officer at the
time of the violation. See id. It is more than a bit ironic that the United States, at Nuremberg, fiercely
opposed the Nazis' right to claim such a defense, and fifty years later, the United States has refused to
support the Statute of the International Criminal Court, largely because the United States wishes to
enable its own nationals to rely on the superior orders defense. U.S. officials have been outspoken
about the country's leadership in the area of international human rights. In addition to recent critique
for its international stances which are the subject of this article, however, the United States also has a
questionable human rights record on the domestic front. See generally RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note
10. Recent studies have shown that the United States has committed grave violations in the following
areas: police brutality; violations in prisons and jails; treatment of asylum-seekers within the United
States; and enforcement of the death penalty. See id. Capital punishment, of course, is the fodder for
a separate article on its own. See id. The death penalty continues to have overwhelming public and
political support within the United States, but has been held to be unnecessarily cruel and even torturous
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may best be explained by factors which have no real place in international
humanitarian law: political closed-mindedness, nationalistic distrust of international law, and fear that U.S. nationals are committing grave violations of human
rights and are thus particularly susceptible to prosecution by the ICC.' 2 This
Comment proposes to arrive at a reconciliation of the discrepancy suggested above.
Section II provides a historical perspective to the creation of the ICC, outlining the3
justifications therefore and the United States' historical role in human rights law.1
Section III gives the reader the framework of the ICC, as derived from the Statute
of the International Criminal Court and other materials. 4 Section IV provides the
United States' position on the ICC and illuminates the reader regarding the
conflicts espoused by the Statute. 15 Section V attempts to reconcile the conflict
with a counter-point to the United States' position.6
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The events that occurred leading up to and during the Second World War
changed the world's common perceptions about the horrific acts of which the
human race is capable. After the atrocities committed by Nazi war criminals were
revealed to the world in the Nuremberg Trials, the U.N. recognized a need to
establish a permanent international criminal court, to be separate from the U.N.,
and to be aimed at prosecuting exactly what World War II had shown was a real
threat. 7 The General Assembly of the U.N., in December of 1948, made the
following statement: "Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has
inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to liberate
mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required."'"
While the Assembly was undoubtedly correct that genocide and crimes against
humanity have occurred throughout history, it is clear that it was World War II
which led to the immediate creation of the U.N., and it is equally clear that the
Nuremberg trials gave a united world its first glimpse at the horrors that the
Holocaust showed were real, legitimate, and likely to recur if left unchecked.'

by the international courts addressing the matter. See id.
12. See Wouters, supranote 8.
13. See infra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 43-79 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 80-167 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 168-212 and accompanying text.
17. See ICC Background Information [hereinafter United Nations Document] (visited January 2,
1999) <http://www.un.org/ icc/overview.htm>.
18. See id.
19. See id.

A. The Nuremberg Trials
The Nuremberg trials began in November 1945, and were intended at the
outset to bring the leaders of Hitler's state to justice.2" Eleven months later, twelve
of the accused were convicted and sentenced to death."z The trials themselves
represented more than bringing finality to the macabre episode which was the Third
Reich; Nuremberg revealed the barbaric nature of what few had suspected was the
truth. 2 Moreover, the trials showed that this barbarism was possible in a western
population which had built itself through capitalistic ventures.2
In short, it
assigned a recognizable face to the previously foreign concepts of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. But to many people living in the relatively
isolated United States of America, that face was foreign; it would be twenty years
before the My Lai story showed them how close it really was.
B. The My Lai Massacre
If anything at all has been learned from history regarding humanity's capability
for evil, it is the notion that such capability is universal. On March 16, 1968, at
7:30 a.m., the U.S. Army showed the world that any fighting force is capable of
committing atrocious war crimes.24 On that morning, the "Charlie Company," Task
Force Baker, Eleventh Brigade of the American Division, entered the tiny village
of My Lai, which is located on the northeastern coast of Vietnam. 5 The Charlie
Company entered My Lai by helicopter, and before they left, the American troops
had massacred between 374 and 50426 civilian women, children, and old men.27
According to village residents, the day started with the familiar sound of gunfire
no shock to the area's inhabitants who knew what it was like to live in a war
zone.28 But this day was different, to say the least. Young American soldiers
gathered civilians together, ordered them into ditches, and pelted them with
machine gunfire. 9 The only exceptions to the practice of immediate death were
young women, who were raped before they were murdered.3" Reportedly, the

20. See GRENVILLE, supra note 11, at 333.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See
Lisa
Grant,
My
Lai (last
visited
January
2,
1999)
<http://204.249.212.251/ushvietnam96/Grant/my-lai.html>.
25. See id.
26. The low figure represents the army's estimate, the high represents that of the village residents.
Paul Alexander, Thirty Years Later, Memories of My Lai MassacreRemain Fresh, NEW STANDARD,
March 15, 1998.
27. See id; see also Grant, supra note 24.
28. See Alexander, supra note 26.
29. See Grant, supra note 24.
30. See id.
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Americans took a lunch break at approximately eleven o'clock a.m., and followed
through with their misdeeds by scorching the village, killing livestock, and
destroying food supplies and freshwater wells.31 The event has been called "one
of the U.S. Army's blackest days." 32
There is no doubt that these facts give a sobering and disturbing account of
what seems at first glance to be an isolated incident in the history of the U.S.
military. But what is equally sobering is what one sees when one peers into the
events leading up to the incident, as well as what transpired following the massacre.
It is astonishing, first of all, that no commanding officers at My Lai ever tried to
stop the murders of women or children as they watched from above in their
helicopters.33 Indeed, it was not until Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr.
threatened to start shooting the GI's if he saw them "kill one more woman or
child," that the murders ceased.34 Then there was the cover-up. "Initial military
reports claimed that the massacre began when two Americans were killed and 10
wounded by booby traps."35 Actually, the only U.S. casualty occurred when one
American soldier shot himself in the foot during the murders.36 Although he had
never served in My Lai, an ex-GI, Ronald Ridenhour, who had heard stories from
friends in My Lai, contacted his Congressman a year after the My Lai massacre and
demanded an investigation.37 Slowly, the investigation began, revealing bribery,
strong-arm tactics by high-end military officials to promote a cover-up, and an
unwillingness to acknowledge any wrongdoing.38 Eventually, however, several
officers were charged, and only one of them, Lieutenant L. Calley, was eventually
convicted.39 The panel in charge of the investigation arrived at a conclusion to the
question, "How could something like this happen?" The answer they reached was
that "My Lai was the result of individuals who shouldn't have been given
command responsibility."' Mike Boehm, a veteran of the U.S. military who was
not involved at My Lai, had a different answer to what went wrong: "The Army

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See Alexander, supranote 26.
See Grant, supra note 24.
See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, MY LAI, 103, Random House, New York (1995).
Alexander, supra note 26.
See id.
See Grant, supra note 24.
See id.
See id.
See id. The testimony of Salvadore LaMartina was as follows:
Q: Did you obey your orders?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were your orders?
A: Kill anything that breathed.
Id. (quoting Tim O'Brien, The Vietnam in Me, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE).

tried to portray [the massacre] as an aberration of poor leadership, that somehow
these people were evil in a way that no one else was .... It could have been me.
We all have the capacity to do evil."'"
Recently, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the U.N., conveyed a similar
sentiment, acknowledging mankind's universal capability of atrocities. In his
statement, Annan heralded the creation of the ICC:
For nearly half a century - almost as long as the U.N. has been in existence - the
General Assembly has recognized the need to establish... a court to prosecute and
punish persons responsible for crimes such as genocide. Many thought.., that the
horrors of the Second World War - the camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the
Holocaust - could never happen again. And yet they have. In Cambodia, in
Bosnia, and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time - this decade even - has shown
us that man's capacityfor evil knows no limits. Genocide... is now a word of our
time, too, a heinous reality that calls for a historic response.42

III. THE IhTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Statute of the ICC
Adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the piece of legislation which
creates the ICC is the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (ICC
Statute).43 The ICC Statute, made up of 128 Articles, not only establishes the ICC,
it also defines its legal status, its jurisdictional parameters, the laws which shall
bind it, the defenses which exculpate its defendants, its investigatory authority, as
well as other framework and functions.' This Comment briefly discusses the first
three Parts to the ICC Statute, as they illustrate the makeup of the court, the crimes
which fall under its jurisdiction, and the substantive rules of the court.4"
1. Preamble
46

The Preamble to the ICC Statute, significantly, details the policy for the ICC.
Some of the principles arising from the Preamble are the duty of States to exercise
their own criminal jurisdiction over international criminals, reaffirmation of the
principles of the U.N. Charter, determination to create a permanent ICC, and
emphasis on the ICC's nature as a complement to the States' domestic criminal

41. See Alexander, supra note 26.
42. United Nations Document, supra note 17 (quoting Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General)
(emphasis added).
43. See generally ICC Statute supranote 3.
44. See id.
45. See infra notes 46-78 and accompanying text.
46. See ICC Statute, supranote 3, Preamble.
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systems.

47

2. Establishment of the Court
Part One of the ICC Statute establishes the ICC as a permanent institution

which shall have power to exercise jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of
international concern. '48 The court will be located in The Hague, Netherlands, and
will have international legal personality so as to enable it to fulfill its functions and
purposes in the international legal system.49

3. Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law
According to the ICC Statute, the ICC will have jurisdiction over the "most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.""0 Article 5
enumerated this concept to include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes

47. See id. The Preamble, representing the policy behind the ICC, states the following:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a
shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time,
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes,
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes,
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the U.N., and in particular that all
States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the U.N.,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any
State Party to intervene in an armed conflict in the internal affairs of any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the U.N. system, with
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,
Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice, Have agreed
as follows: [followed by the body of the Statute].
Id.
48. See id., art. 1.
49. See id., arts. 3 & 4.
50. See id., art. 5.
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of the most serious nature, and the crime of aggression."
Under the category of genocide, the ICC Statute defines such acts as those

"committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group ... ."52 The particular acts which may comprise a crime of
genocide under this definition include "killing members of the group, causing

serious bodily or mental harm to members, deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions so as to physically destroy the group, preventing births within the group,
and forcibly removing the children of a group."53 With regard to crimes against
humanity, the ICC Statute addresses acts which are "committed as part of a
.""
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population ....
While the ICC Statute does list specific acts which may constitute crimes against
humanity, it should be noted that, as with all of the crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC, they will only fall under the court's gambit if they rise to the level of
widespread or persistent attacks on a civilian population. 5 Individuals who commit
war crimes will also fall under the control of the court when the crimes are

committed as "part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of
such crimes."56 Article 9 of the ICC Statute describes how elements of the crimes

51. See id.
52. See id., art.6.
53. See id.
54. See id., art. 7. The specific acts under this category which are contemplated by the Statute are:
murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape or other sexual crimes;
persecution; enforced disappearances; apartheid; and other acts intended to cause suffering or serious
injury. See id.
55. See id., art. 7(l).
56. See id., art. 8. "War crimes" for the purposes of this article are defined as:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war ...to serve for a hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a Prisoner of war.., of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation ...
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b)...
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population...
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects;
(iii)Intentionally directing attacks against [the instrumentalities] involved in a humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping mission;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
environment...
(v) Attacking or bombarding... towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended
and not military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a [surrendered soldier];
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag.., of the enemy, or of the U.N.,...
. resulting in death or serious personal injury;
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which will be handled by the ICC shall be decided."

Specifically, "they shall be

adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States
Parties."58 Amendments to the elements of a particular crime may be proposed by
state parties, judges and the prosecutor, and will be adopted by two-thirds of the
members of the Assembly of States Parties, provided they are consistent with the
ICC Statute.59 Article 12 is an extremely powerful and significant provision
because it gives the court jurisdiction over an individual defendant if a State agrees,
if the conduct was committed on the territory of a signature State, or if a signatory
State is the citizenship nation of the alleged perpetrator. 6°

4. General Principles of Criminal Law [As applied to the ICC]
Uniquely, the ICC Statute does not merely set up the institution and authorize
its basic powers. It actually determines the precise principles of law which will
bind its defendants, effectively acting as its own criminal code.6' This confinement
to its own internal law applies not only to the crimes' elements and nature, but also

(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings of religion, education, art, science, or
[charity], historic monuments, hospitals .... provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments ...which are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person nor carried out in his or her interest...
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions
of the nationals of the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling [hostile] nationals to take part in the operations of war directed against their
own country;
(xvi) Pillaging...;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body...;
(xx) Employing weapons... which.., cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or
which are inherently indiscriminate...
(xxi) Committing outrages on personal dignity;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery...
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians...
(xxvi) . . . enlisting children under fifteen . . . or using them to participate actively in

hostilities.
Id.
57. See id., art. 9.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id., art. 12.
61. See id., arts. 5-125.

to any punishment which is to be initiated by the court.62 Article 27 declares that
it is irrelevant whether a person holds official capacity; the jurisdiction of the ICC
applies regardless.63 This status neither exempts an individual from punishment,
nor does it entitle the defendant to a reduced sentence or immunity therefrom.'
Similarly, Article 28 places responsibility onto the part of commanding officers for
the actions of their inferiors if that commanding officer knew or should have
known of the commission of the ciimes and failed to take all reasonable action to
prevent the actions.65 Article 29 provides that no statute of limitations shall apply
to these gravest of all international crimes.66 Intent, a necessary element to the
crimes falling within the Statute, is defined in Article 30 as a meaning to cause the
consequences or awareness that they will occur in the normal course of events.67
Grounds for excusing criminal liability for acts committed are laid out in
Article 31.68 If a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders a
person unable to appreciate the unlawfulness of the conduct or the capacity to
control the conduct, there will be no criminal culpability.69 Similarly, where the
defendant was intoxicated to the same mental state, liability will be extinguished.7"
One should point out the leniency of this provision.7 Additionally, reasonable
self-defense or defense of others, or serious duress caused by the threat of
imminent death or serious injury, where the defendant has acted necessarily and
reasonably to extinguish the threat, shall shield the defendant from liability.72
As to whether a mistake of fact shall exclude culpability for a crime otherwise
within the Statute's contemplation, the ICC Statute provides that it shall only
exclude criminal responsibility if the mistake negates the necessary mens rea of the
particular crime." Mistakes of fact, as well, are no justification for the crime,
unless they mistake the requisite mental element.74
Article 33 of the ICC Statute is particularly relevant to this Comment in that
it fosters a major disagreement between the U.S. Delegates and those of most of the
rest of the U.N. General Assembly and, therefore, the world. The Article
specifically addresses the defense of "superior orders. '75 Stated simply, such a

62. See id., art. 23.
63. See id., art. 27.
64. See id.
65. See id., art. 28.
66. See id., art. 29.
67. See id., art. 30.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. It seems odd for a tribunal, which is solely geared at prosecuting the world's worst offenders
of human rights, to abdicate all culpability because a military commander was intoxicated when, for
example, he ordered the extermination of a population.
72. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 31.
73. See id., art. 32.
74. See id.
75. See id., art. 33.
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defense argues the proposition that a defendant who commits an act otherwise
within the contemplation of the ICC Statute76 should be exculpated by the mere fact
that the crime was committed as a result of a superior officer's orders. Stated
plainly, it is the "I was just following orders" defense which was asserted by Nazi
war criminals at Nuremberg." Article 33 of the ICC Statute states, "[tihe fact that
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian,
shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless.. ." the defendant
was under a legal obligation to follow the orders, the individual did not know that
the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful." What is the
logic behind U.S. opposition to across-the-board application of ICC jurisdiction?
Section hV seeks to shed light on the topic.79
IV. THE UNITED STATES' POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE ICC
Generally speaking, the United States has had a troubled history with regard
to accepting the authority of international tribunals. Perhaps the best recent
example of this is the Nicaraguacase."0 In April of 1984, Nicaragua filed charges
against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)"1 , accusing the
Reagan administration of trying to overthrow the government in force. 2 The ICJ,
a month later, ordered the United States to respect Nicaragua's borders and halt the
mining of its harbors. 3 The U.S. administration announced in response, however,
that the United States would refuse to respect any World Court rulings on Central
America for the next two years.' The following year, Washington declared that
it would no longer obey the ICJ at all unless it chose to."5 "It's simply arrogance,"

76.

In other words, the defendant committed genocide, a crime against humanity, or a crime of

aggression or war which was directed toward the destruction of a civilization. See id., art. 5.
77. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
78. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 33.
79.

See infra notes 80-167 and accompanying text.

80. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
81.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is also known as the World Court. It is based in The

Hague, Netherlands, and is the principal judicial body of the U.N.. The ICJ was formed in 1946, and
since then has presided over more than 96 cases, 60 judgments, 23 advisory opinions, and 290 orders.
It is distinguishable from the recently-approved ICC in that the ICC will hear only the gravest of all
international criminal violations, whereas the ICJ's docket is much less confined. The ICJ currently
deals mostly with civil compensatory suits between nations. See United NationsDocument, supranote
17.
82.

See Wouters, supra note 8.

83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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said Ken Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch.86 "We don't want to
play by the same rules as everyone else."87 In 1986, the court found the United
States guilty of violating international law through its support of contra rebels, and
ordered the payment of reparations to Nicaragua.88 The United States has not
heeded the ruling.8 9
With regard to the ICC specifically, from the very beginning of the negotiations involving the drafting of the ICC Statute and creation of the ICC, the U.N.
Delegates from the United States had postured under the guise of being in favor of
the ICC, often claiming that they wanted it to be "strong," but taking measures to
in fact weaken it.' The position of the United States is quite complicated, hence
the necessity for this Comment. Officially, the United States claims it supports the
idea of an independent international forum in which to prosecute perpetrators of
the gravest international crimes. 9' Why then was it among the seven members of
the opposition, up against 120 others, when the vote was finally cast?9 2 Why has
it been widely reported that the applause which met the vote was just as much
geared at making a statement to the United States, the superpower "bully," as it was
to cheer the outcome of the vote? 93
The United States, clearly, has a long and distinguished history of acting as the
world's premier peace-keeping force.94 It is from this history, and the inevitable
self-image which arises therefrom, that the conflicts with regard to the ICC surface.
Generally speaking, the consensus has been, first of all, that "despite posturing
[with regard to the proposals it has made to weaken the ICC] ... the United States
in general is committed to the creation of a strong and effective International
Criminal Court." 95 Yet what has happened runs somewhat counter to this general
statement.
On July 23, 1998, six days after the ICC was approved 120 to 7 by the U.N.
General Assembly, David J. Scheffer, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.
Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal

86. Id.
87. Id.

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See generallyStatement ofDavidJ.Scheffer, Ambassador-at-LargeforWar CrimesIssues and
Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. DiplomaticConference on the Establishment of a Permanent
InternationalCriminal Court before the Committee on ForeignRelations of the U.S. Senate, July 23,
1998, <gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org/oo/orgs/icc/natldocs/rome/scheffer0798.txt> (stating that the world
has a "responsibility to confront ... assaults on humankind" but advocating a Court which allows
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council - the United States included - to veto any action taken
by the ICC) [hereinafter Scheffer Statement].
91. See id.
92. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
93. See Floy Lilley, The Superpower the World Loves to Hate, (visited Nov. 28, 1998)
<http://www.sovereignty.net/p/gov/rome7-6.htm>.
94. For example, the United States pays for approximately 25% of the U.N.'s efforts. See id.
95. See id. (quoting Jerome Shestack, president of the American Bar Association).
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Court, returned to Washington in order to report the results of the Conference to
members of Senate.96 Addressing the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Senate, Scheffer first highlighted the official United States position regarding the
need for an international criminal tribunal.97 Scheffer noted that, "we live in a
world where entire populations can still be terrorized and slaughtered by
nationalistic butchers and undisciplined armies," and further asserted that the
United States, "as the most powerful nation committed to the rule of law .... [has]
a responsibility to confront these assaults on humankind."98 He went on to state
that through accountability, perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes may be brought to justice."
Scheffer continued to acknowledge the difficulty of the task of "fusing the
diverse criminal law systems of nations and the laws of war into one functioning
courtroom in which [the United States] and others had confidence criminal justice
would be rendered fairly and effectively."'"° He labeled the challenge of creating
a treaty-based tribunal "daunting" in that sovereign governments will naturally
disagree as to terms regarding jurisdiction and other areas of content of the
document.'O l Scheffer also noted that the United States took a "methodical"
approach to drafting the ICC Statute, as opposed to certain other governments who
wanted to "rush to conclude" the task.' 2 In this regard, Scheffer asserted that the
United States' approach had prevailed.0 3
Next, Scheffer outlined the precise objectives of the U.S. Delegates when they
arrived in Rome on June 13, 1998."' The delegation, made up of members of the
Departments of State and Justice, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the United States Mission to the U.N., and "the private sector," all
contributed to the negotiations.0 5 Specifically, Scheffer listed the objectives which
he claimed he and his comrades successfully gleaned out of the negotiations,
visible concepts in the finished ICC Statute." ° Those principles which he laid
claim to were the following: a structure of the ICC which defers, through the
concept of complementarity, to national jurisdictions, eliciting "significant
protection" of nationals (though he was quick to point out that the delegates had

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Sheffer Statement, supra note 90.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

102.

See id.

103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

not received as much protection as they had sought);

members of the U.N. Security Council'

7

an effective veto power by

giving it the power to "intervene to halt

the court's work;" sovereign protection of national security information which

may become relevant in a prosecution;"10 acknowledgment by the court of national
judicial procedure;"' ICC treatment of internal domestic conflicts;'12 extensive due
process protections for defendants and suspects;" 3 incorporation of elements into
the definitions of crimes which the court will prosecute;""ICC treatment of gender
issues;1 5 provisions in the ICC Statute which treat command responsibility and
superior orders in an acceptable fashion;" 6 rigorous qualification requirements for

judges;" 7 allowance for state party funding of the ICC;" 8 a panel of state parties
whose function it will be to oversee the workings of the ICC;' 9 reasonable
amendment procedures; 20 and a high number of ratifications necessary to gain full
entry into force of the ICC Statute.' 2 ' The foregoing list of concepts represents
those which the U.S. Delegates helped to frame with regard to the ICC Statute. In

general, one may notice that the United States has openly nurtured a distrust for a
powerful ICC, expressing concern that its nationals may be prosecuted for a crime
122
falling within its jurisdiction committed while on a "peace-keeping" mission.
These concerns are equally apparent in the text which follows, representing those
objectives which Scheffer was disappointed to report were not accepted by the

107. See id. This is perhaps the most crucial of the United States' gripes with the ICC: the fact that
it is still too powerful and independent of an institution, despite efforts to weaken and disperse that
power by Scheffer and his staff.
108. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are the United States, France, the
United Kingdom, China, and Russia.
109. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. Scheffer, however, pointed out that the delegation was not satisfied with the elements
which made it into the ICC Treaty, and also that, specifically with regard to war crimes, the United
States was unwilling to accept that a forcible transfer of a population into an occupied territory would
constitute such a crime. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. Recall the discussion, supra, regarding superior orders. The United States, through the
Statement of Scheffer, is acknowledging primary responsibility for the limiting language of Article 33
of the Statute, which negates criminal liability on the basis of superior orders if certain criteria are met.
This was one of the key disagreements between the United States and the vast majority of the
Conference, and is discussed further infra.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. The number required is sixty. Regardless of the overwhelming number of signatories,
sixty parties will have to ratify fully the Statute of the ICC for it to enter into force, binding parties and
non-parties alike. See id.
122. Scheffer wamed that a scheme that "ignored [the] responsibilities" of U.S. peacekeeping forces
"is not going to serve the vital interest of the [ICC]." See id.
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Conference and will thus be absent from the final ICC Statute. The "critical"
nature of these objectives probably speaks 23
to the fact that the United States voted
"no" at the conclusion of the Conference.
Scheffer first noted that while the United States was successful in avoiding
"universal jurisdiction" of the ICC, the form ofjurisdiction eventually agreed upon
by the overwhelming majority of delegates was unacceptable. 24 Specifically, the
ICC Statute asserts that in order for the court to have jurisdiction over a particular
crime, either the state of territory where the act was committed, or the state of the
nationality of the perpetrator of the crime must be either a party to the treaty or
have granted its voluntary consent to jurisdiction of the ICC. 25 During negotiations the United States sought to include a provision which required both of these
countries to be a party to the treaty, or a provision which stated that in order for
jurisdiction to prevail, consent of the state of the nationality of the perpetrator
would be necessary.'26 This proposal, by all accounts, was hissed, booed, and
overwhelmingly defeated by most of the rest of the world.'27
Scheffer went on to state that the resulting jurisdictional scheme which is
cradled by the ICC Statute leaves in place a system that "do[es] not serve the cause
of international justice."'28 Most of the atrocities which the ICC will address, he
asserted, are the result of "internal conflicts between warring parties of the same
nationality."'2 9 For this reason, he pointed out, if there are two non-parties to the
treaty who are in conflict, both can be fully insulated from ICC jurisdiction. 30
Scheffer next contemplated the situation in which the U.S. armed forces, as a nonsignatory, operate in a signatory state's territory and commit a violation of the ICC

123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. It is sufficiently clear that this proposal by the U.S. delegation was an attempt to shield
its nationals from the reach of the ICC. By requiring both states to be parties to the treaty, the United
States is effectively rendering its own nationals immune from prosecution if the United States does not
sign the treaty, which, of course, it did not. As an alternate strategy, by requiring the consent of the
state of the nationality of the perpetrator, the United States would have created an ICC Statute under
which states could choose whether or not their nationals would be held accountable. Some
commentators have pointed to the outrageousness of this proposal in that it would shield the worst
perpetrators of all: the Saddam Husseins of the world, as well as giving isolationist states such as the
United States an opportunity to refuse consent whenever one of their soldiers was put up on a charge.
See Lilley, supranote 93; see also Wouters, supra note 8.
127. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90; see also supranotes 5-8 and accompanying text.
128. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
129. See id.
130. See id. While Scheffer and his delegates are correct at first glance, it should be pointed out that
this scenario does not consider a situation under Article 13(b) or 13(c), in which the Security Council
itself initiates a proceeding. Recall that the United States itself is a permanent member of the Security
Council, giving it vast powers to conduct such an initiation.
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Statute.'
Since the ICC Statute warrants prosecution by the ICC in such a
scenario, Scheffer claimed, it is not only contrary to fundamental principles of
treaty law, but could also "inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military
to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations, including
humanitarian interventions to save civilian lives."' 32
A second objective which was taken to Rome by U.S. Delegates and
eventually limited by the Conference is the idea that "states should have the
opportunity to assess the effectiveness and impartiality of the court before
considering whether to accept its jurisdiction."' 33 Thus, Scheffer and his delegates
proposed a 10-year "opt-out" period, in which the United States or any state party
could negate jurisdiction of the court with respect to crimes against humanity or
war crimes." Furthermore, at the end of the ten years, states would have had the
opportunity "to accept... automatic jurisdiction ... over all of the crimes, to cease
to be a party [to the treaty],
or to seek an amendment to the treaty extending its
'opt-out' protection."' 35 In justifying the proposal's credibility, Scheffer claimed
that the period was important for the United States to evaluate the ICC's
performance 136 and assess whether it is performing its goals.' 37 Eventually, a
somewhat diluted opt-out provision was adopted: a seven-year period to object to
jurisdiction for war crimes only.13' Additionally, Scheffer expressed dismay at the
principle that, under the current ICC Statute, both signatory and non-signatory
states may be susceptible
to jurisdiction for crimes which are newly adopted or
39
newly amended.
The United States was also disappointed by the fact that the ICC Statute
enables a prosecutor to initiate investigations and prosecutions without referring
the matter to the court. "" Opposition to this ability stems from the idea that it will
"encourage overwhelming the court with complaints," at the expense of the ICC's
financial resources, as well as fostering the possibility that the ICC will become

131. See id. It is crucial to understand fully the depth of this statement. A violation of the ICC
Statute, the reader will recall, is the gravest of all international crimes, reserved solely for crimes such
as genocide, crimes against humanity, severe crimes of aggression, and severe and willful war crimes.
See supranotes 50-79 and accompanying text.
132. See Scheffer Statement, supranote 90. Scheffer, however, did not expand on exactly why the
threat of prosecution would be sufficiently real in this situation. It remains puzzling to this author why,
for instance, genocide, crimes against humanity, or other grave, willful violations of human rights,
would be incidental to meeting alliance obligations or humanitarian aid.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. For a discussion on what some commentators call the "arrogance" of the United States when
it comes to purely international matters, see infra notes 168-212 and accompanying text.
137. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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'
fixated with "controversy, political decision-making, and confusion."141
As for the crime of aggression in particular, the United States' position is that
the crime has not been sufficiently defined in customary international law' 42 to
warrant criminal responsibility.' 43 Currently, the ICC Statute includes the crime of
aggression as within the parameters of the ICC's jurisdiction, but it leaves the
definition to an amendment which will be adopted seven years after the Statute's
entry into force. 1" Scheffer and the United States are somewhat disillusioned by
the fact that this proposed amendment, to date, is not to be linked to a Security
Council finding that a state had committed the crime of aggression.' 45 If such a
linkage does not exist, the United States will oppose the amendment.'46
Additionally, the United States, as well as other countries, continues to oppose
the jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes of terrorism and drug crimes."' The
reasoning for this opposition, according to Scheffer, is that national efforts in these
regard are simply more effective, and an international presence will only undermine
them."' s As it stands, the current ICC Statute includes the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to future definition of the two offenses.'49 This
fact "greatly concerned" the U.S. Delegates, and they made a public explanation
for their opposition, claiming that the problem lay in the investigatory abilities
national and international efforts will have in their future quest to combat the
crimes.5 0 Specifically, Scheffer explained, the ICC "will not be equipped
effectively to investigate and prosecute these types of crimes," and, therefore,
should completely defer to domestic systems already in place.''
Another area in which U.S. negotiators were defeated in the end was that of
liability of commanding officers.5 2 During negotiations, U.S. Delegates argued
that military commanders were to be held to the full rigors of international law,

141. See id.
142. Customary international law is considered to be one of the principal sources of international
law, given the same effect as treaties which are in writing. To become customary international law, a
principle must have sufficient usage (i.e., the idea that the principle is followed in a sufficient number
of nations in the world), and there must be opiniojuris(i.e., the nations following the principle must
believe they are following the principle because of some international obligation).
143. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.

while their civilian commanders should not.'53 This attempt was based on the
natural protection that would have been given by the U.S. Constitution, which
requires a system where civilians control the military.' 54 In the end, the majority
did not agree to these tactics.' 55
The last fodder for United States' opposition to the ICC Statute is in regards
to reservations to the treaty.' 56 Under Article 120, no reservations to the ICC
Statute are to be allowed.' 57 The United States took the position that, at the very
least, where domestic constitutional requirements and national judicial procedures
conflict to the point of mandating a reservation, such a reservation should be
allowed, provided they do not defeat the intent or purpose of the treaty. 8 This, as
well as the foregoing list of U.S. objections, was considered and defeated by the
59
vast majority of the U.N. delegates.
In addition to the statements made by Scheffer when he addressed the Senate,
many accounts of the drafting sessions from Rome supported the contention that
the United States sought to limit the power of the ICC. With regard to the
definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity, while most states did not wish
to limit the ICC's jurisdiction to cases where the defendant intended to destroy a
particular number of individuals in the group, a small number of states agreed with
the United States that the ICC should have jurisdiction only when the accused
intended to destroy a substantial part of a particular group.'"
Additionally, U.S. Delegates were reported to differ greatly with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was represented in
proposals by New Zealand and Switzerland with regard to what should be included
in the list of crimes which may make up genocide and crimes against humanity. 6'
The ICRC specifically mentioned the crime of rape, making it clear that it was to
be considered a grave breach of the Geneva Convention and thus to be within the
ICC's contemplation.' 62 By contrast, the United States was much more restrictive
in its proposals.' 63 It urged that the ICC Statute should employ the wording of the
1907 Hague Convention." 6 In addition, the United States argued that there should
have been an opening paragraph to the crime against humanity section of the ICC
Statute which outlines that jurisdiction would be restricted to those crimes

153. See Francis Boyle, Reversing the Gains of Nuremberg (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.atlantic.net/-odin/netline/hypocrisy.html>.
154. See id.
155. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
156. See id.
157. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 120.
158. See Scheffer Statement, supra note 90.
159. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 120.
160. See Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN PreparatoryCommittee
on the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'LL. 124, 126-27 (Jan. 1998).
161. See id. at 128.
162. See id.
.163. See id. at 128-29.
164. See id.
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"committed as part of a systemic plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such offenses,"' 65 as opposed to the wording proposed by the ICRC,
which used the term "serious breaches."' 66 In the end, the ICC Statute included
language from both proposals.167
V. COUNTER-POINT: FAVORING A STRONG ICC
In contrast to the efforts .ofScheffer and the other U.S. Delegates, the vast
majority of the representatives at the U.N. favor a strong ICC.'68 This tendency had
its origin in December 1948, when the General Assembly of the U.N. stated that
"[r]ecognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity; and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge, international co-operation is required."' 69 At that point, the
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, and invited the International Law Commission (ILC) "to
study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ
for the trial of persons charged with genocide...." 7o That project was placed on
hold until 1994, when the ILC submitted a draft statute to the General Assembly.'
Almost fifty years after the idea of the ICC sprouted, Kofi Annan, SecretaryGeneral of the U.N., recently made the following statement, summarizing in
idealistic prose the goals of the "other side," the vocal majority in support of a
strong ICC:
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal
justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its
realization. We will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you ... to do
yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of
distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover ofjustice;
that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be
punished.'

To the majority of the delegates at the Rome Conference, the new ICC

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.

id. at 128 n.22.
id. at 128.
id.
supranotes 5-8 and accompanying text.
United NationsDocument, supra note 17.
id.
id.
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represents the proverbial "missing link" in the international legal system.'73 The
ICJ only has jurisdiction over states, not individuals who breach an international
obligation.174 Heretofore, individual acts of genocide and crimes against humanity
have gone virtually unpunished.'75 In Cambodia in the 1970's, an estimated two
million people were butchered by the Khmer Rouge.'76 Similarly, conflicts in
Mozambique, Liberia, and El Salvador elicited a staggering loss of civilian lives,
including overwhelming numbers of unarmed women and children.'77 In Algeria
and the Great Lakes region of Africa, such civilian massacres continue today.I"7
Historically, the lack of an international mechanism such as the ICC has
created the situation under which commentators have explained, "[a] person stands
a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being than for
killing 100,000."' The lack of a mechanism by which to try individual violators
of human rights violates the general principle gained from Nuremberg, whose
tribunal stated that "crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."' 80 This concept was echoed by
Benjamin B. Ferencz, former Nuremberg prosecutor, who said, "There can be no
peace without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a
Court to decide what is just and lawful under any given circumstance.''.
There remains little doubt that setting up a permanent international criminal
court is the answer to these concerns. One issue which remains, however, is that
expressed most often and most strongly by the U.S. Delegates, that the court should
require the consent of the perpetrator's country of origin.'82 Those who oppose this
sentiment maintain that "[c]rimes under international law by their very nature often
require the direct or indirect participation of a number of individuals at least some
of whom are in positions of governmental authority or military command."' 83 In
times of conflict, domestic criminal systems are often either unwilling or unable to
act as they should, usually for one of two reasons.' As was the case in the former
Yugoslavia, states often lack the political will to prosecute their own citizens.' 85
Other times, the national institutions have collapsed to the point of inability to

173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
176. See United Nations Document, supra note 17.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. (quoting Josd Ayala Lasso, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
183. See United Nations Document, supra note 17 (quoting Report of the International Law
Commission, 1996).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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address the prosecution of offenders, as in the case of Rwanda." 6 The ICC's
complementary nature addresses these concerns. The court will only be called
situations arises: unwillingness or inability to act by
upon when one of two
87
domestic institutions.1
Some U.N. Delegates have expressed concern that without the support of the
United States, the world's sole remaining superpower, the ICC's effectiveness will
be limited: 8 8 "I'm afraid we will have a court that may not work. It may be like
the League of Nations or certainly will take a very, very long time to be
effective."' 89 So what exactly is the disagreement all about?
The first area of disagreement to be discussed is the U.S. proposal that, if it
had been adopted, would have exempted peacekeepers and others from war-crimes
prosecution for actions committed while on official duty, unless the home country
consented to prosecution."' Human rights organizations, of course, fiercely
opposed the proposal, and ultimately won on the floor. "It would mean that if you
wanted to ever investigate or prosecute Saddam Hussein, you would have to ask
Iraq's permission to go ahead.''. Reminiscent of the final vote, the proposal was
struck down 113 to 17, and the defeat was met with a "prolonged rhythmic
applause."' 2
Another major area of disagreement between delegates from the United States
and the supporters of a strong ICC is that of the United States' "unique"
peacekeeping obligations worldwide.' 93 Specifically, the Pentagon fears that its
soldiers abroad on such rmissions will face politically motivated prosecutions, and
also worries about charges arising from civilian deaths in peace-keeping
operations. 94 Scheffer argued that "[t]he United States... ha[s] ... responsibilities around the world that are critical to the protection of civilian populations."' 95
In opposition to such arguments, the majority argues however, that the structure of
the ICC, with its complementary jurisdictional scheme, prevents politically
motivated prosecutions as well as trying individuals for incidental losses of human
life while on peace-keeping missions.'9 6 A case in point is the My Lai Massacre,

186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Gayle Young, "Treaty creating war-crimes court gets preliminarynod." (last visited July
17, 1998) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9807/17/intemational.court/index.html>.
189. Id. (quoting Muhammed Sacirbey, Bosnian delegate to the U.N. treaty conference).
190. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
191. Young, supra note 188 (quoting Jelena Pejic of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
192. See id.
193. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
194. See Wouters, supra note 8.

195.

See id.

196.

See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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discussed supra in Part II.B. "9 What existed there was an extreme case of flagrant
and wanton breaches of human rights by the U.S. military. Yet even in such a case,
U.S. servicemen would not have been brought before the ICC. Recall that
commanding officers were tried domestically, and that one conviction - - that of
Lt. William Calley - - was achieved.' 98 Because the prosecution was initiated
domestically, ICC jurisdiction would never have come into effect.'99 Ken Roth,
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, summarizes the United States'
position as follows: "The Pentagon is terrified that a United States soldier may be
brought before this court - it's a fictitious fear [because of complementary
jurisdiction]." 2" Still, the words of Senator Jesse Helms addressed the concerns
of U.S. lawmakers in the days before the final vote on the ICC. Helms, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that the ICC Statute would be
"dead on arrival" if the possibility existed that an American could ever be brought
before the court.20'
In addition to exemplifying arrogance in their treatment of ICC negotiations,
U.S. Delegates have also been accused of bullying other nations. Pierre Sane,
Secretary-General of Amnesty International, stated that "a few powerful countries
appeared willing [in negotiations] to hold justice hostage by threatening and
bullying other states, and seemed sometimes to be more concerned with shielding
possible perpetrators from trial rather than producing a charter for victims."2 2
Others were more up-front in their criticism of U.S. tactics in the negotiations.
Candice Hughes wrote that "the United States wanted a loophole effectively
putting Americans out of the court's reach."2 3 Hughes went on to describe
American pressure as "intense. '2"" "[Ilts delegation wielded virtually every
carrot-and -stick at its disposal. It threatened poor nations with a loss of aid and
allies like Germany with the rupture of key military alliances.""2 5 Similar tactics
were recounted by a delegate:
[The United States] tries
to tell us all what to do ....The United States is a bully.
They have tried to destroy this important effort by denying the prosecutor true
independence from the superpowers' grasp. The P-5 [Permanent Five members of
the Security Council] will never turn over their own people and they are the
criminals using weapons of mass destruction. They have twisted the words of the
document. In French the words meant an opt-out within the initial seven years, not

197. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
199. See Wouters, supra note 8.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Amnesty International, USA Crippled at Birth, (last visited July 17, 1998)
<http://www.amnesty-usa.orgflsn/iccreports/071798.html>.
203. See Hughes, supra note 2.
204. See id.
205. Id.
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an opt-out for seven years, as it was translated.2"
Ferencz, a former prosecutor at Nuremberg, explained a likely reason for the
United States' blatantly coercive tactics to attempt to create a watered-down ICC.
A strong ICC, he says, "will trample on America's sovereignty ....Antiquated
notions of absolute sovereignty are absolutely obsolete in the interconnected and
interdependent global world of the 21st Century."2 7 This statement, of course,
applies a modem view of sovereignty. Ferencz's assertion ignores the fact that
America would never have been a nation if the ICC had been in place.2 8 "[The]
Revolutionary War would have been regarded as a "criminal act" by [the ICC]." 2 9
Then again, there may be some truth to the suspicion that the United States is
merely seeking to continue its isolationism and shield its nationals from inevitable
prosecutions by the ICC. Non-Governmental Organizations such as Amnesty
International have publicly called the United States on its military conduct." 0 For
instance, Former President George Bush has been accused of ordering U.S. troops,
during the Gulf War, to massacre some 100,000 retreating Iraqi civilians on the
after Saddam Hussein agreed to a cease-fire involving
"Highway of Death" a day
211
withdrawal from Kuwait.
Despite widespread claims that the ICC, as it stands currently, is a watereddown institution which appears strong on paper but is weak in reality, some
observers, such as "William Pace, the coalition's coordinator, praised the treaty as
'one of the greatest victories for peace in the last 100 years .... This is the rule of
law prevailing over the rule of brute force.""'2 2 Watered-down tribunal? Victory
for peace? Stay tuned.
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Lilley, supranote 93 (quoting an unnamed advisor to the Lebanese delegation).
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. (citing the conference publication Terra Vista).
See Hughes, supra note 2.

